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1 This  very  useful  survey  outlines  how analysts  in  Europe,  Japan and America  cover
China’s economy, its politics, and its foreign policy. Much of the book, such as Robert
Ash’s chapter on “Studies of China’s Economy in Europe” offers a tour d’horizon of who
is doing what and where. This review, however, will focus on the substance.
2 Ash highlights Chris Bramall’s “argument that the weakening of private and CCP-based
interest  groups  was  a  significant  factor  facilitating  the  post-1978  reallocation  of
resources from inefficient heavy industries to more efficient sectors,” that a “state-led
development strategy may achieve more than one based on capitalist mechanisms,”
and that “China’s success derived from favorable political and institutional conditions
not necessarily replicable….”
3 To me, the PRC government was crucial in building infrastructure, in managing the
currency,  in  defeating  opponents  of  openness,  and  in  welcoming  the  dynamics  of
globalisation. China’s success, as depicted in the books of business correspondents such
as James Kynge (China Shakes the World) and James McGregor (One Billion Customers)
grew  from  an  entrepreneurial  frenzy  in  which  many  thousands  of  money-hungry
entrepreneurs went, say, into motorcycle production, not selling one-third of what was
produced, leading to huge numbers of bankruptcies and much pain, but also a fostering
of the globally competitive China price.
4 Hideo Ohashi’s chapter on “Studies of China’s Economy in Japan” focuses on what is
known about the extraordinary post-Mao economic rise and its global impact. Ohashi
finds that Japan’s “recovery from prolonged recession in the 1990s” was so much aided
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by taking advantage “of the opportunities offered by China’s economic growth” that
the study of China’s economy is also the study of Japan’s. He points out that Japanese
are  fixated  on  the  frailties  of  the  Chinese  economy  and  worry  about  potential
destabilisation effects.
5 But is it useful to treat China as “in transition to a market economy”? Comparative
studies  of  wealthier  industrialised  societies  reveal  that  nations  can  rise  with  quite
different mixtures of state and market. Why not hypothesise that the Chinese mixture
is but another possible successful amalgam rather than assuming a necessary evolution
towards a free market, which actually exists nowhere? Treating the post-Mao system as
stable and successful is more in line with Ohashi’s conclusion that “China has become
an ‘ordinary country’.”
6 Penelope Prime’s essay on “Studies of China’s Economy in the United States” echoes
Ohashi’s  finding  that  “Scholars  with  no  previous  training  in  Chinese”  studies
increasingly do important work on China. She also notes that analysts treat China as
“…‘in  transition’  from  planning  to  markets,”  a  case  of  gradual  privatisation  and
inefficient  but  politically  necessary  SOEs,  rather  than  as  one  of  many  possible
combinations  of  state  and  market.  Prime’s  chapter  importantly  highlights  the
insightful debate on sources of growth.
7 Jean-Pierre Cabestan’s chapter on “Studies of Chinese Politics in Europe” points out
that analysts in the EU, a grouping of democracies, have been more focused than others
on human rights and the prospects for democracy, working on China’s gulag,
democratic Taiwan, oppressed Uighurs, the environment, inequality, good governance
and  liberalisation.  The  big  question  is  whether  overall  modernisation  wins  out  or
whether “the regime cannot change and will eventually collapse.” If China does not
democratise, it will become unstable. But why not conclude that the CCP regime has
already successfully transited from Mao’s version of Stalinism to a stable right populist
authoritarianism that can win performance and nationalist legitimacy as standards of
living continue to rise and as China rises in global stature?
8 Tomoyuki Kojima’s introduction to “Studies of Chinese Politics in Japan” worries that
analysts  lack  an  independent  analytical  framework  and  therefore are  “too  deeply
influenced by [an understanding of] Chinese politics” as explained by the ruling CCP
itself.  Instead,  similarities  to  South-east  Asian  development  systems  should  be
highlighted. This means focusing on “the contradiction between one-party rule” and
the  societal  changes  that  stem  from  marketisation  and  globalisation  (e.g.,  a  rising
middle  stratum  and  money  elites  tied  to  power  elites)  in  a  society  with  strong
traditional  continuities.  Given “institutional  immaturity,”  a  misfit  between Leninist
institutions  and  the  dynamics  of  market-oriented  growth,  Kojima  worries  that
individual leaders will appeal ever more to “nationalism to maintain (…) cohesiveness”
because assertive societal groups are growing in importance while Party mechanisms of
control are weakening. There are more possible futures than either inevitable, gradual
democratisation or instability.
9 Richard Baum’s chapter on “Studies of Chinese Politics in the United States” praises
centrist  scholars  in  the  1960s  and  1970s  who  understood  CCP  politics  in  terms  of
“bureaucratic politics and interest groups,” as in Brezhnev’s Soviet Union, rather than
leftists who saw Maoism as a model for poor countries. But why did China and Russia
develop so differently despite similar interests and bureaucratic politics?
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10 Using a generational analysis, Baum sees political scientists as ever more rigorously
trained, focused first, in the early reform era, on a weakened CCP and a strengthened
civil society, and then, after the 4 June 1989 Beijing massacre, on Latin American-type
corporatism co-opting societal groups. By the end of the 1990s, analysts moved on to
study state capacity, on the one hand, and a resurgence of pre-CCP societal forms, on
the other. Baum worries that the recent rise of rational choice and econometric models
privileges analysts who plug in a method which is “so narrowly focused” that it throws
little light on what is actually shaping state-society tensions.
11 Since none of these models or formal approaches foresaw the post-Mao rise of China or
the 1989 democracy movement, why not highlight insightful empirical, descriptive and
ethnographic work, whatever the scholar’s approach? Why not be disenchanted by the
overly rapid rise  and fall  of  paradigms and approaches as  Chinese policy changed?
Perhaps the complex and unpredictable political reality of a very contingent realm of
human endeavour, politics, cannot be reduced to any one of these ceaselessly changing
American political science paradigms.
12 Kay Möller’s chapter on “Studies of China’s Foreign and Security Policies in Europe”
finds that much analytical work has been mis-shaped by domestic European political
imperatives.  In  the  era  of  China’s  rise  towards  superpower  status,  there  is  a  split
between democratic publics worried about both human rights abuses in China and also
threats  to  Europe  from  China  and  national  governments  promoting  commercial
interests  and therefore  arguing  that  engagement  will  transform the  PRC’s  political
system,  a  most  soothing perspective,  deconstructed for  America  in  Jim Mann’s  The
China Fantasy.
13 European passivity is legitimated by the notion of the CCP government as a responsible
regime. “[S]haring the PRC’s unhappiness with the unipolar world,” Europe slighted
China ’s “lack of sensitivity vis-à-vis smaller neighbors, not to mention Taiwan .” Still,
twenty-first  century  PRC  policies  in  former  European  colonies  in  Africa  (Sudan,
Zimbabwe and Angola) have made an impact on European views. Möller sees China’s
rise to superpower status as “a bluff,” contending that Europe should not accept the
Bush-Hu consensus on “the relative unimportance of social justice and protection of
the global environment.”
14  “Studies of China’s Foreign and Security Policies in Japan” by Seiichiro Takagi shows
Japanese analysts  portraying Mao as  defensive and not  as  seeking to  challenge the
Soviet Union for leadership of the anti-imperialist movement, as instead is depicted by
critical analysts in the PRC. In the post-Mao era, analysts are more concerned with an
assertive  Chinese  nationalism,  with  some  seeing  a  hard-line  hegemonistic  agenda.
Takagi  alone  highlights  rising  concern  about  how the  CCP is  dealing  with  “energy
security,” including the building of a blue water navy, imposing control of the South
China Sea, and challenging Japan in the East China Sea, all as part of “establishing a
‘Sinocentric world’.” As one analyst put it,  “ China ’s perception of its own conduct
diverges seriously from others’ perception of it….China’s powerful memory of national
humiliation…is responsible for the misjudgment.”
15 In  the  final  substantive  essay,  David  Shambaugh’s  chapter  on  “Studies  of  China’s
Foreign and Security Policies in the United States, the author highlights how, despite
tactical  flexibility,  the CCP leaders view of China’s rightful role in the world makes
likely assertiveness against an America seen as an obstacle to China’s rise. And yet “the
Chinese internal discourse” assumes a declining America and Russia, a rising India, and
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a  threatening  Japan.  Shambaugh’s  focus  is  security  studies,  issues  that  are  openly
debated, and gaps in knowledge.
16 These well-informed and critical overviews allow readers to judge how well analysts of
China have done and what could produce yet better work.
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